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 The Rise of the Unelected addresses the inverse correlation between the increasing promi-
nence of specialized unelected bodies in modern democratic life and elected decision-
makers;  ‘ as the importance of the unelected rises, so the importance of the elected 
declines ’ (p. 2). Specifi cally, insights from democratic theory and public administration 
approaches are used to assess the dangers to democracy posed by the seemingly inexo-
rable proliferation of non-majoritarian institutions (there are around 200 in the UK alone 
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and 250 in the USA; p. 5). The book ’ s message is unexpectedly optimistic. Modern poli-
ties are not only enlightened by the unelected but democracies can actually be strength-
ened by what the book ’ s author Frank Vibert terms the  ‘ new separation of powers ’ . By 
untangling issues of legitimacy from those of accountability the separation of powers 
provides the blueprint to the challenge to democracy posed by unelected bodies. Follow-
ing the founding fathers in the US, the legitimacy of this new  ‘ fourth branch ’ rests on its 
independence from citizens and mutual respect for the core functions of the legislature, 
executive and judiciary. Dilemmas of accountability are approached similarly  – as part 
of a system of checks and balances to be imposed on the unelected by the other branches. 
This traditional framework inspires a range of suggestions about how conventional 
democratic practices might be strengthened by and adapted to the rise of the unelected. 
These suggestions represent the focal point of the text and an overdue contribution to 
the literature on delegation and the politics of expertise. 
 The book ’ s fi rst chapter covers a review of the world of unelected institutions in which 
Vibert categorizes and lists the different types of prominent unelected agencies in the 
UK, USA, Australia and EU member states. Worked examples in the text are drawn from 
the UK. Despite their multitude and diversity, unelected bodies such as the Gangmasters 
Licensing Authority (GLA) and Bank of England are united by the technical nature of 
their work and reliance on information and involvement in communities of expertise 
that lie beyond government. The message is simple; the experts who are member of un-
elected bodies conceptualize themselves as part of a  ‘ self-effacing class ’ (pp. 32 – 3) that 
sit apart from politics. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 expand on the distinction between the empirical components of pub-
lic policies and value judgements about how evidence translates in normative and prac-
tical terms and its implication for strengthening democracy. A clear institutional 
demarcation between the empirical (as the preserve of the unelected) and value-driven 
interpretation of this evidence (as the responsibility of the elected) will help to promote 
public confi dence in the empirical basis of policy and to enable citizens to target their 
concerns and criticisms more accurately. Of particular importance is the discussion in 
Chapter 3 concerning how in practical terms these two streams of judgement can actu-
ally be separated from one another in the fi rst place (pp. 48 – 54). Vibert ’ s argument is 
underpinned by the logic that decision makers will determine what is acceptable in a 
specifi c context. Little is said, however, about the extent to which this may have been 
pre-determined by the methods selected to drive empirical investigation. Given the cen-
trality of this distinction for the new separation of powers thesis promoted by Vibert, 
further depth to empirical discussion of  ‘ hard cases ’ would have been welcome. 
 Vibert goes on to discuss the limitations of political theory and public administration 
approaches to meet the challenges the delegation of authority to expert bodies poses to 
democratic practice. Chapter 4 discusses the limitations of mainstream democratic theo-
ries concerned with civic participation, deliberation, and the rule of law. The reduced 
role for mainstream political institutions, the limited extent of public engagement, and 
unclear constitutional status implied by the rise of unelected bodies neuter the analytical 
utility of these traditional approaches. Similarly, in Chapter 5, Vibert rejects principal-
agent, constitutionalism and pragmatism on the basis that they seek to rationalize rather 
than reduce the increasing gap between citizens and information that is increased by the 
seepage of power away from elected bodies. 
 In Chapters 6 and 7, Vibert elaborates his new separation of powers thesis. In this, the 
institutional incentives operate to reduce the informational asymmetries that frustrate 
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collective action. Where unelected bodies enjoy sovereignty over knowledge creation, 
politicians are able avoid the blame for unpopular information, and self-effacing un-
elected experts rest assured that their pronouncements will be untainted by non-
empirical values and the fate of their professional reputations in their hands. One of the 
most intriguing aspects of Vibert ’ s thesis is the change he predicts in the behaviour of 
the electorate. The interests of unelected agencies will be served best by engaging with 
citizens  – greater public understanding of the information will boost the support of these 
agencies and protect them from political interference. This informed citizenry will desta-
bilize the conventions of representative democracy and the unquestioning delegation of 
power to politicians. There is a radical dimension to the separation of powers; the rise of 
the unelected as problem-solvers and the increasing demands of informed citizens mean 
that traditional political institutions must take a lead in shaping the values that link evi-
dence-gathering processes to the political. In his brief discussion of arenas and inquiries 
(pp. 107 – 12), however, Vibert offers only hints about the actual mechanisms through 
which traditional institutions can adapt. 
 Vibert returns to the unelected in Chapter 8 and the means through which these bod-
ies can justify their powers. Following the separation of powers logic, non-majoritarian 
institutions must rest upon their own form of legitimacy rather than derive legiti -
macy from other government branches or public acceptability. Scientifi cally derived 
knowledge-based principles and procedures  – for example, peer review and impact 
assessment  – form the bedrock of the claims of these bodies to direct forms of legitimacy. 
While he uses an analogy with the judiciary to good effect, Vibert ’ s dismissal of the ar-
gument that standards can always be disputed as subjective would have benefi ted from 
greater consideration and case study evidence from unelected bodies themselves. 
 Chapters 9 and 10 represent a distraction in an otherwise well-structured book as 
Vibert takes us beyond the national arena and discusses some of the challenges posed by 
the rise of the unelected in the EU and international organizations. The book concludes 
with an account of the avenues of accountability that should be opened to control the 
exercise of power by unelected bodies. Vibert envisages a traditional system of checks 
and balances to hold the unelected within the limits of their power and the provision of 
a limited range of political sanctions that discourage encroachment beyond the provi-
sion empirical evidence. Even if we accept the view that it is philosophically and em-
pirical possible to distinguish between empirical information and values in most of the 
issues addressed by unelected bodies, solid empirical examples are required of the prac-
tical measures that could be imposed on a transgressor. 
 This text has much to recommend itself to several audiences. Vibert provides an up-
beat and accessible account of how the democratic dilemmas posed by the rise of the 
unelected might be addressed in practical terms. The book must be read with an aware-
ness of its limitations however. In particular, the new separation of powers thesis re-
quires fuller empirical investigation. One can only hope that among the many scholars 
interested in delegation some turn their attention to its implications for democratic prac-
tice and empirical appraisals will be produced to complement Vibert ’ s valuable book. 
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